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Abstract
This paper proposes a method by which estimates of hypothetical willingness to pay for
public goods with passive-use value can be compared with actual willingness to pay
inferred from aggregate voting and tax liability data.
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I. Introduction
Private preferences for goods that are provided collectively can be measured by economic
valuation methods that are based on observed individual behavior. For instance,
information about preferences for urban air quality improvements may at least partly be
inferred from variations in the price of properties exposed to varying amounts of
emissions. As another example, preferences for a recreational fishery resource may be
estimated from time and money individuals actually spend fishing. Such studies can yield
market-calibrated estimates of value thus providing important inputs to decision processes
about the provision of public goods.
There are, however, important public goods the preferences for which do not leave
any observable “trace” in individual behavior. Such goods include for instance the
preservation of wilderness areas, from which individuals may benefit merely by knowing
about their existence. The values of such goods have been termed “passive-use”,
“existence”, or “non-use” values. The increasing importance of these values for public
decision making and the difficulty in their measurement gained much attention in the
process of damage assessment following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989. According to
present wisdom, the only economic valuation methods that are potentially able to estimate
these values are stated preferences techniques, such as the contingent valuation method
(CVM). These methods use surveys, in which respondents are asked about their
willingness to pay for a proposed project concerned with the provision of a public good, or
about their decision in a hypothetical referendum or other choice situation.
While stated preferences for many public goods can be compared with values
derived from observed choices, there is little opportunity to test whether stated preferences
for public goods with passive use values are reliable. This is a significant problem since3
for a variety of reasons surveys of hypothetical choices may not always provide
respondents with the necessary incentives to think hard and answer truthfully.
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Researchers have thus started to examine potential bias of hypothetical values in situations
involving private commodities where a direct comparison of stated and actual choices is
feasible, or by comparing stated values with those inferred using revealed preferences
techniques (Carson et al. 1996). Although such studies shed important light on the
reliability of stated choices they are by their nature unable to externally test the validity of
stated passive-use values of public goods.
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However, there appears to be a way to test the reliability and estimate potential
biases of stated passive-use values. As Arrow et al. (1993) suggested, the problem may be
approached by comparing hypothetical values for public goods with willingness to pay
implied by closely similar real-world voting decisions. This would involve conducting a
stated preference survey before an actual referendum is subjected to voters. Stated
individual choices could then be compared with actual choices. However, to our
knowledge no one has so far examined how exactly this should be done.
The aim of this paper is to present a method by which point estimates of stated
willingness to pay (WTP) for public goods might be compared with WTP values inferred
from aggregate voting outcomes. The presentation begins by positing the conditions under
which the method is feasible. A theorem, based on these conditions, is then proposed.
Next, the conditions for the theorem are examined, and its rationale is graphically
illustrated. A final section concludes.
                                               
1 Some encouraging results in this respect, however, are reported from a recent study that attempted to
eliminate biases by directly confronting respondents with the hypothetical bias problem (Cummings and
Taylor 1999).4
II. The Model
In a rational voter context, consider the following conditions on a referendum decision
about a proposed increase of a public good from provision level Q0 to Q1:
I. There is institutional congruence, i.e., the voters are consumers of the public
goods as well as being taxpayers. All potential voters participate in the vote.
II. The sharing of costs for financing the public good is determined independently
of the specific project at hand.
III. The budget is balanced (equal income and expenditures).
IV. Each issue is voted on separately. There is no tie with other projects.
V. Preference orderings are single-peaked.
VI. A project is considered accepted if it is approved of by at least a simple
majority, that is, by 0.5 n + 1 of the n voters.
VII. Coalitions among voters are considered impossible due to high costs of
bargaining.
Assumptions I–VII belong to the set of median voter assumptions (see e.g.
Buchanan 1968). For the approach to CVM calibration presented here, the additional
assumptions VIII–XI are required:
VIII. Individuals’ WTP for the proposed public good increase, up to a random
effect of taste, is monotone increasing in income.
IX. The individual’s (perceived) tax increase in case of approval, up to a random
term, is monotone increasing in income.
                                                                                                                                            
2 An exeption to this are a few recent studies involving hypothetical and actual donations (see e.g.,
Cummings et al. 1997). However, these choices are quite different from those about public goods to be
provided collectively.5
X. The probability of individuals’ approval, up to a random effect of taste, is
monotone increasing in income.
XI. The random terms have zero expectation and equal variance for all income
levels.
Finally, assumptions XII and XIII regard the process of surveying stated WTP:
XII. Stated WTP for the proposed public good increase is surveyed with no
influence of the upcoming actual referendum on the survey process.
XIII. The survey sample is representative of the voter population.
We will return to these conditions further below. Based on these assumptions we
state the following
THEOREM: Given I–XIII, as sample size increases, the pth percentile individual on
the distribution of individual approval probabilities can be identified asymptotically with
the pth percentile individual on the income distribution, which in turn can be identified
with the pth percentile individual on the distribution of stated WTP.
Assuming that p percent of the individual reject the referendum, the pth percentile
individual is roughly indifferent between accepting or approving the referendum. His or
her additional tax payment due to the public good increase, DTp, should therefore equal his
or her actual WTP. This “indifferent voter’s” actual WTP can be directly compared with
the same percentile in the hypothetical WTP distribution, Wp. The appropriate “calibration
factor” for hypothetical WTP is then simply the ratio DTp/Wp. In a concrete case this factor










, where f(Ip)r, is the tax function, composed of the fixed tax schedule f(Ip) (with I for
income) and a variable tax rate r which is set annually in accordance with the planned
budget (B), and DQ is the proposed public good provision increase, measured in money
units.
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III. Examination of Assumptions
Rational voter assumptions and median voter assumptions are well discussed
elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Mueller 1989). Assumptions XII and XIII concerning the
process of surveying stated WTP are evident. Assumptions VIII–XI regarding
identification of percentiles on distributions, however, warrant further attention. The
conditions for these to be true are closely analogous to those derived and used by
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) in equating the median of public good quantities
demanded with the quantity demanded by the citizen with median income. Let the actual
WTP of a citizen i for the proposed public good increase be given by a function of income
WTP(I), the individual tax increase by a function DT(I), and let NWTP (net WTP) denote
the difference  ()() WTPITI -D . Then, assume that an individual’s probability of approval
y*i can be expressed by  *() i yNWTP . To examine the effects of differences in income on
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3 Referenda on the provision of regional or national public goods are often held at levels of government
encompassing several or many voting districts. If sufficiently large samples of CVM responses are available
for each of several voting districts the comparison of hypothetical and actual WTP can be made for each
individual district. Theoretically, variations in income levels (and WTP) across voting districts could then be
used to examine if calibration factors differ among different income groups.7








where d is the elasticity of approval probability with respect to net WTP, w is the income
elasticity of WTP, and x is the elasticity of the additional tax payment with respect to
income. If for all values of I, d>0 and w-x>0, then the higher the citizen’s income, the
higher will be her probability of approval. Thus, the probability of approval is a monotone
increasing function of income, and the median (or any other percentile) individual on the
distribution of individual approval probabilities is equal to the respective percentile
individual on the income distribution. If, however, w -x  is positive for some income
levels and negative for others, y* will not be monotone increasing in income. In this case
the WTP of the median (or any other percentile) individual on the distribution of approval
probabilities will not in general be the WTP of the consumer with median (or respective
percentile) income.
IV. Illustration
The relationships between income, WTP, and additional tax payments underlying the
required approval probability that is monotone increasing in income, are illustrated in
figure 1. Apart from the special case where all individuals agree with or all reject the
proposition (and thus no one’s WTP can be estimated) WTP will exceed DT above some
income level Ip. This is the income of the voter, who is indifferent regarding approval or
rejection of the proposition or, in other words, whose oval probability y* equals 0.5. Thus,8
in contrast to the median voter case, where the individual with median demand can be
identified on the income distribution, the identifiable individual is here the citizen with an
approval probability of 0.5. The indifferent voter’s WTP is illustrated in figure 2 as the
area under the demand curve between the two public good provision levels Qq and Q2.
This area is equal to the tax increase, which is defined by the same provision levels and
the indifferent voter’s marginal cost curve. As the graph assumes constant unit costs and Q
is measured in money units, the indifferent voter’s cost curve is simply his or her tax price
tp.
V. Implications
The presented approach is to our knowledge the first detailed method so far proposed to
externally validate and calibrate contingent values for collectively provided public goods
with important passive use value. Given continuing debate over the degree of hypothetical
bias in stated preference valuation methods, the presented validation method should be a
useful tool to help resolve this debate. We acknowledge, however, that much theoretical
and empirical
4 work remains to be done to evaluate how seriously various hardly
avoidable violations of model assumptions may impair the accuracy of estimated
hypothetical survey bias.
                                               
4 A first empirical application of this “indifferent voter approach” is presented in Schläpfer and Hanley
(2002), which however relies on CVM and referendum propositions that are not identical.9
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Figure 1 Identification of the indifferent “pth percentile” voter with the pth percentile
individual on the income distribution: illustration of the conditions on
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Figure 2. The indifferent (pth percentile) voter’s WTP for an increase of a public good
from Q0 to Q1.
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